Introduction: Marijuana Laws and Federalism by Chemerinsky, Erwin
Boston College Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 3 Article 2
6-12-2017
Introduction: Marijuana Laws and Federalism
Erwin Chemerinsky
University of California, Irvine School of Law, echemerinsky@law.uci.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Conflict of Laws Commons, Criminal Law Commons,
Food and Drug Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Law and Society Commons, Law
Enforcement and Corrections Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Erwin Chemerinsky, Introduction: Marijuana Laws and Federalism, 58 B.C.L. Rev. 857 (2017), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/
vol58/iss3/2
  857 
INTRODUCTION: MARIJUANA LAWS  
AND FEDERALISM 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY* 
In 1971, as a college freshman debater, one of the issues we debated was 
whether marijuana should be legalized. As I researched the topic, the argu-
ments were overwhelmingly in favor of legalization, and it was difficult to put 
together a credible case for continued criminalization. Over 45 years have 
passed and the law has finally begun to change. An increasing number of states 
now have legalized or decriminalized possession of small amounts of marijua-
na.1 As a result of initiatives in the November 2016 election, Colorado, Alaska, 
Oregon and Washington are now joined by California, Maine, Massachusetts 
and Nevada in legalizing possession of small amounts of marijuana.2 Nearly 
half of the states allow medical use of marijuana.3 
At the same time, however, marijuana remains a Schedule 1 controlled 
substance under the federal Controlled Substances Act, along with opoids, like 
heroin, and hallucinogenics, like LSD.4 The current Attorney General of the 
United States, Jeff Sessions, strongly opposes legalization of marijuana, and 
there is the real prospect of greater federal prosecutions for violations of the 
Controlled Substances Act.5 
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 1 See Sam Kamin, Legal Cannabis in the U.S.: Not Whether but How?, 50 UC Davis L. Rev. 617, 
620-24 (2016) (providing a brief history of state marijuana legalization efforts). 
 2 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1 (West 2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § I.P. Ques-
tion 2, § 1–18 (West 2017); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 §§ 2441–2454 (2017); H.B. 3932, 189th Gen. 
Court (Mass. 2016). 
 3 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X § 29; Act of Apr. 28, 2010, ch. 194, 2010 Ariz. Adv. Legis. Serv. 
(2010); Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment of 2016, const. amend. 98, 2016 Ark. Legis. Serv. 
(2016); Act Concerning the Palliative Use of Marijuana, Pub. Act No. 12-55, 2012 Conn. Acts 147 
(Reg. Sess. 2012); An Act to Amend Title 16 of the Delaware Code Creating the Delaware Medical 
Marijuana Act, ch. 23, 2011-2012 Del. Laws (2011); Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Treat-
ment Amendment Act of 2010, D.C. Law 18-210, 57 D.C. Reg. 34 (Aug. 20, 2010); Act of Aug. 1, 
2013, Pub. Act. No. 98-0122, 2013 Ill. Laws 3015; Act No. 343, 2016 La. Sess. Law Serv. (2016). 
 4 Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 
21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2012)). 
 5 See Andrew Blake, Jeff Sessions Says He’s ‘Surprised’ Americans Aren’t Embracing His Anti-
Marijuana Stance, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/apr/
13/jeff-sessions-surprised-americans-marijuana/ [perma.cc/RV3V-83L6]; James Higdon, Jeff Ses-
sions’ Coming War on Legal Marijuana, POLITICO (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2016/12/jeff-sessions-coming-war-on-legal-marijuana-214501 [perma.cc/C9U5-
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These changing laws have resulted in an enormous inconsistency in the 
laws with regard to marijuana between the federal government and the states 
as well as among the states. Contrary to what many believe, marijuana laws 
continued to be enforced. For example, in 2014, according to statistics from 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 700,993 individuals in the United States—
one every forty-five seconds—were arrested and charged with marijuana viola-
tions and of these, 619,678, or 88 percent, were arrested for simple posses-
sion.6 For marijuana to remain illegal, there is an enormous cost in terms of 
law enforcement resources, the criminal justice system, and people’s lives. 
Even for those arrested and never prosecuted or convicted, arrest records have 
real harms in terms of the ability to get jobs, loans, housing and benefits.7Like 
all drug laws, the prohibition against marijuana is much more likely to be en-
forced against African-Americans and Latinos than against whites. According 
to a 2013 study conducted by the American Civil Liberties Union, whites and 
African-Americans use marijuana at roughly the same rates, but African-
Americans are 3.7 times more likely than whites to be arrested for possession 
of marijuana.8 
At the same time, however, marijuana is a huge cash crop in the in the 
United States. According to some industry estimates, the total American can-
nabis industry generated retail sales of $53 billion in 2015.9 Further, over the 
past two years, the fraction of marijuana sold through legal channels has grown 
from an estimated $3 billion to nearly $6 billion, as more states have voted to 
allow medical or recreational use.10 Professor DeVeaux notes that “[m]arijuana 
is the most lucrative cash crop in the United States.”11 
                                                                                                                              
SQZH]; Carrie Johnson, Legal Marijuana Advocates Are Uneasy with Sessions’ Stance, NPR (Apr. 6, 
2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/04/06/522821701/legal-marijuana-advocates-are-uneasy-with-
sessions-stance [perma.cc/NMH6-WUZT]. 
 6 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 2014 Crime in the United States, https://
ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/persons-arrested/main [perma.cc/MB9K-
DFTD] (last visited June 5, 2017); see also Carimah Townes, Marijuana Arrests Suddenly Rose Last 
Year Even as States Legalized Pot, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 28, 2015), https://thinkprogress.org/
marijuana-arrests-suddenly-rose-last-year-even-as-states-legalized-pot-f664220f4f32 [perma.cc/
V23M-5VKT]. 
 7 See Jesse Wegman, The Injustice of Marijuana Arrests, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2014), https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/opinion/high-time-the-injustice-of-marijuana-arrests.html?_r=0 [per-
ma.cc/FC2U-AX3L] (describing the devastating toll of a marijuana arrest). 
 8 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE: BILLIONS OF 
DOLLARS WASTED ON RACIALLY BIASED ARRESTS 9 (2013). 
 9 Melia Robinson, People in the US and Canada Spent Over $53 Billion on Marijuana in 2016, 
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/us-canada-marijuana-spending-legal-
illicit-2017-1 [perma.cc/KR3G-29L8]. 
 10 See ARCVIEW MARKET RESEARCH, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, THE STATE OF LEGAL MARIJUANA 
MARKETS 4 (5th ed. 2017). 
 11 Chad DeVeaux, One Toke Too Far: The Demise of the Dormant Commerce Clause’s Extrater-
ritoriality Doctrine Threatens the Marijuana-Legalization Experiment, 58 B.C. L. REV. 953, 958 
(2017). 
2017] Marijuana Laws and Federalism 859 
Illegality under federal law and in many states, though, poses serious le-
gal problems. Professor Berch notes: “Federally insured banks may decline to 
accept money from marijuana commerce because of the threat of money laun-
dering prosecutions, leaving the businesses largely cash-only and cash-on-site. 
Marijuana dispensaries may not deduct business expenses from federal taxes. 
Lawyers may encounter ethical dilemmas advising marijuana businesses be-
cause attorneys cannot knowingly assist clients in illegal conduct, even if that 
conduct is legal in state in which the lawyer practices or the client acts.”12 
From the perspective of constitutional law, the inconsistency in marijuana 
laws between the federal government and many states, among the states, and 
between the states and Native American tribes raises serious and often unprec-
edented federalism issues. This wonderful collection of Articles addresses 
them. 
One set of issues arises when considering whether the federal law prohib-
iting even possession of small amounts of marijuana preempts state laws that 
allow possession of small amounts of marijuana.13 The simple answer should 
be no, states can have any law they want – including none at all – with regard 
to marijuana. No state is required to have a law prohibiting or regulating mari-
juana.14 Indeed, it would violate the Tenth Amendment for Congress to compel 
states to have and enforce laws prohibiting possession of marijuana.15 A state 
may choose to have no law prohibiting marijuana, a law prohibiting marijuana 
with an exception for medical use, or a law allowing possession of small 
amounts of marijuana—essentially anything else it wants. Of course, the 
choice by a state to legalize marijuana does not have any effect on the federal 
law or federal enforcement of it. Under current law, possession of marijuana is 
still a federal crime and the federal government can choose to enforce its law 
however it chooses. Legalization by a state, in some or all circumstances, just 
means that it is not a state crime. 
The more difficult arising issue is whether states, by legalizing marijuana 
and then regulating and taxing it, are impeding the federal government from 
achieving its goals in making marijuana a Schedule 1 controlled substance. 
One way of finding preemption is if a state interferes with achieving an objec-
                                                                                                                              
 12 Jessica Berch, Reefer Madness: How Non-Legalizing States Can Revamp Dram Shop Laws to 
Protect Themselves from Marijuana Spillover from Their Legalizing Neighbors, 58 B.C. L. REV. 863, 
970 (2017). 
 13 See Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. 
& POL’Y 5, 10 (2013) (citing cases that employed broad conflicts preemption analysis). 
 14 See id. 
 15 See TODD GARVEY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE SU-
PREMACY CLAUSE, FEDERALISM, AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS 6 
(2012) (“Congress’s ability to compel the states to enact similar criminal prohibitions, to repeal medi-
cal marijuana exemptions, or to direct state police officers to enforce the federal law remains limited. 
The Tenth Amendment likely prevents such an intrusion into state sovereignty.”). 
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tive under federal law. Professor Lea Brilmayer addresses this in her Article A 
Central Theory of Preemption: With Comments on State Decriminalization of 
Marijuana.16 Professor Brilmayer points to the key considerations in such a 
preemption analysis, including the motives of Congress and of the states, the 
baselines – “the standard of comparison against which the state’s challenged 
law must be judged” and the magnitude of the state’s failure to cooperate with 
federal law enforcement.17 
A second set of federalism issues, and the ones most focused on in this 
Symposium, arise from the enormous variance among the states with regard to 
marijuana laws. The Articles in this Symposium often refer to these issues as 
“horizontal federalism issues,” as distinct to the “vertical” ones that arise from 
the relationship of the federal government and the states. For example, Profes-
sor Gabriel J. Chin, in his Article Policy, Preemption and Pot: Extraterritorial 
Citizen Jurisdiction asks the question: “[C]an one state prohibit its citizens 
from using marijuana elsewhere in the United States or anywhere in the 
world?”18 Although he concludes that “states of the United States generally do 
not regulate the conduct of their citizens on a nationwide or international ba-
sis,” he does not preclude the possibility of their doing so.19 Professor Mark D. 
Rosen, in his Article Marijuana, State Extraterritoriality, and Congress, argues 
that states may regulate conduct in other states, but that Congress should act to 
determine the bounds of state’s extraterritorial powers.20 
Other Articles in this Symposium address aspects of the relationship 
among the states with regard to their varying marijuana laws. Professor Jessica 
Berch, in her Article Reefer Madness: How Non-Legalizing States Can Re-
vamp Dram Shop Laws to Protect Themselves from Marijuana Spillover from 
their Legalizing Neighbors, argues that states should change their laws to allow 
civil liability against those who sell marijuana to those who cause harms.21 She 
says: “A Gram Shop Act, like its namesake, the Dram Shop Act, would create 
liability against out-of-state marijuana dispensaries that sell to Home State 
Buyers who, while high, injure third parties in the Home State or those who 
are residents of the Home State.”22 
In contrast, Professor DeVeaux’s Article One Toke Too Far: The Demise 
of the Dormant Commerce Clause’s Extraterritoriality Doctrine Threatens the 
                                                                                                                              
 16  See generally Lea Brilmayer, A Central Theory of Preemption: With Comments on State De-
criminalization of Marijuana, 58 B.C. L. REV. 895, 902 (2017). 
 17 Id. at 911. 
 18 Gabriel J. Chin, Policy, Preemption and Pot: Extraterritorial Citizen Jurisdiction, 58 B.C. L. 
REV. 929, 931 (2017). 
 19 Id. at 949. 
 20 See generally Mark D. Rosen, Marijuana, State Extraterritoriality, and Congress, 58 B.C. L. 
REV. 1013, 1015 (2017). 
 21 See generally Berch, supra note 12. 
 22 Id. at 972. 
2017] Marijuana Laws and Federalism 861 
Marijuana-Legalization Experiment argues that the dormant commerce clause 
should be understood to limit the ability of a state to regulate conduct in other 
states.23 He urges the courts to revitalize the dormant commerce clause’s con-
straints on the ability of a state to impose extra-territorial regulation and ex-
presses concern that without this limit states will be undermined in their ability 
to experiment with legalizing marijuana. 
Like Professor DeVeaux, Professor Alex Kreit, in his Article Marijuana 
Legalization and Nosey Neighbor States,seeks to keep states that prohibit mari-
juana from preventing other states from legalizing it.24 Both professors begin 
by describing the lawsuit filed in the Supreme Court by Nebraska and Okla-
homa against Colorado claiming injury from the latter’s legalization of small 
amounts of marijuana. Although the Supreme Court did not take this case, the 
underlying issue presented remains. Professor Kreit argues that “as currently 
constituted state marijuana laws are unlikely to have anything more than a neg-
ligible effect on neighboring states.”25 In part, this is because “marijuana is 
already relatively inexpensive and easy to find in prohibition states.”26 Addi-
tionally, in Professor Kreit’s view,  this is because “state marijuana legalization 
laws all share a number of features that make it difficult to make much money 
by exporting the product across state lines.”27 
Professor Katherine Florey, in her Article Budding Conflicts: Marijuana’s 
Impact on Unsettled Questions of Tribal-State Relations, examines the hori-
zontal federalism question in a different context: the relationship to Native 
American tribes.28 She examines current tribal policies with regard to marijua-
na and examines the similarities and differences to efforts to allowing gam-
bling on Native American reservations. She urges allowing tribal autonomy, 
while recognizing the great tensions created when marijuana is legal within the 
Native American controlled area of a state that otherwise prohibits marijuana. 
She says that it may be necessary for the federal government to act “to provide 
both protection for tribal sovereignty and mechanisms for resolving legitimate 
spillover concerns.”29 
Of course, to a large extent, the problems discussed in this Symposium 
could be solved by federal government action. If Congress passed a law legal-
izing possessing small amounts of marijuana and preempted states from pro-
hibiting this, the federalism issues would be solved. As many of the Articles in 
                                                                                                                              
 23 See generally DeVeaux, supra note 11. 
 24 See generally Alex Kreit, Marijuana Legalization and Nosy Neighbor States, 58 B.C. L. REV. 
1059 (2017). 
 25 Id. at 1062. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See generally Katherine Florey, Budding Conflicts: Marijuana’s Impact on Unsettled Questions 
of Tribal-State Relations, 58 B.C. L. REV. 991 (2017).  
 29 Id. at 1021. 
862 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:857 
this Symposium noted, public attitudes towards marijuana are changing and 
now substantially favor legalization, but such federal legislation legalizing ma-
rijuana is not on the horizon. Instead, the legal landscape is likely to remain 
one in which there is a conflict among the laws of various jurisdictions—
federal, state, and tribal. Thus, the federalism issues addressed in this Sympo-
sium are likely to be discussed and litigated for years to come. Lawyers, judg-
es, legislators, and academics dealing with these questions will benefit enor-
mously from this collection of Articles. 
